lunes, 7 de septiembre de 2009

IV. Relating it to another reading: Eugenio Trías' idea of the 'limit'

'Hadrian's Wall' in northern England                                                           

Regarding the ideas of Gómez Pena's "In defense of performance", establishing a link to the ideas of catalan philosopher Eugenio Trías might prove to be useful. Trías is one of the most known philosophers in the spanish speaking world. Over the last 25 years, he has been refining his own philosophical proposal: a 'philosophy of the limit', that encompasses an onthology, an epistemology, an anthropology and an ethics. All of it circles around the idea of 'limit'. But what does he mean when he talks about 'limit' or limes?:
"Yo apunto la idea de que nuestra condición es fronteriza, de que se ilumina desde esta noción de límite que debemos pensar y entender en un sentido muy particular. A este respecto, siempre evoco y recuerdo lo que los romanos denominaban limes, que no era una línea evanescente, como la del horizonte que circunscribe el ámbito visual, sino un territorio. Cierto que se trataba de una franja oscilante, llena de precariedad, entre lo de acá y lo de allá, entre lo que circunscribía el ámbito imperial romano y lo que constituía lo extraño, lo extranjero, lo bárbaro. Y el habitante de ese limes recibía un nombre específico, que se puede encontrar con tan sólo consultar un diccionario de etimología: limítrofe. Trofé significa "alimentarse" en griego, así que, fíjense qué curioso, limítrofe significará algo así como "el que se alimenta de los frutos que en el propio limes se cultivan". Por tanto, la noción de límite me sirve tanto para circunscribir un territorio como para identificar un personaje que no es sino un intento de teorización y de reflexión sobre ese viejo contencioso de la filosofía moderna acerca de la idea de sujeto. Un contencioso que se ha pensado como concluido, puesto que en la postmodernidad se ha hablado mucho de la defunción del concepto de sujeto, de su desaparición, pero que en mi opinión puede ser perfectamente recreado, resucitado, como sujeto limítrofe, sujeto fronterizo que en cierta manera identifica la característica de lo que somos e ilumina una posible propuesta ética habida cuenta de que la filosofía no es sólo una definición de lo que somos, sino también una proposición respecto a lo que debemos ser pudiendo o a lo que podemos ser debiendo, y ése es el ámbito de una ética."
("I point out the idea that our condition is a border one, which is illuminated from this notion of limit that we must think and understand in a very particular sense. In this respect I always evoke and remember what the romans called limes, which was not an evanescent line, as the one in the horizon that circumscribes the visual realm, but a territory. It is true that it was an oscillating strip, full of precariousness, between what is here and what is there, between what circumscribed the roman imperial realm and what constituted the strange, the foreigner, the barbarious. And the inhabitant of that limes received a specific name, that can be found just by consulting a dictionary of etymologies: limítrofe [in spanish, 'bordering']. Trofé in greek means "to be fed", so -look how intriguing it is-, limítrofe means something like "the one that is fed by the fruits that are cultivated within the limes". Therefore, the notion of limit is useful both to circumscribe a territory and to identify a character [ethos]; that is, not more than an attempt of theorization and reflection on that old dispute of modern philosophy around the idea of the subject. A dispute that has been considered to be finished, given that in postmodernity much has been said about the defunction of the concept of subject, of its disappearance, but which in my opinion could perfectly be recreated -resurrected-, as a bordering subject, a borderline subject that in a way identifies the characteristic of what we are and sheds light on a possible ethical proposal; considering that philosophy is not only a definition of what we are, but also a proposition of 'what we should be as we can' or of 'what we can be as we should', and that is the realm of ethics." -the translation is mine-)
["Los Retos de la Filosofía". A presentation by Eugenio Trías. Bilbao: May 6th, 2002. http://servicios.elcorreodigital.com/auladecultura/trias2.html accessed on September 5th, 2009.]

Trías finds that humans occupy a very special place 'inbetween'. He/she moves between an animal and a divine condition, between the physical and the spiritual, between cultura and natura, between the body and the world; human beings are also both rational and irrational (emotional), the battle field where a constant fight takes place between apolinian and dyonisian forces to put it in nietzschean terms. "That is why man can be considered an inhabitant of the border, not belonging here or there, neither animal nor god, but bordering or with the quality of a centaurus. (...) Thus, the limit, found between the nature and the world, constitutes our own condition. A condition always refering to a middle term between two indetermined ends." ("Habitar el límite. Un acercamiento a la ética de Eugenio Trías." Revista Digital Universitaria, Vol.6, No. 41. http://www.revista.unam.mx/vol.6/num4/res/intres.htm accessed on September 5th, 2009)
Limes in this sense is the place where the ethical experience is made possible. Human beings are presented with a set of given circumstances, framed by a given (though border and fluid) condition. He/she is challenged by a situation which demands some kind of response. That is the space to be dealt with the 'practical [ethical] reason':
"en virtud de la libertad y responsabilidad que posee el hombre de responder a dicha propuesta según su acción o praxis de forma afirmativa o negativa; es decir, mediante su acción se argumenta el ajuste a su condición fronteriza o el desajuste a esa proposición. Así, el hombre tiene en el límite el signo de su identidad, pero en razón de su libertad dispone de la posibilidad de decidir por su propia condición o de contradecirla optando por el comportamiento inhumano e incurriendo en desmesura o hybris."
("under the freedom and responsibility that man has to respond to such proposal through his/her action or praxis in an affirmative or negative way; that is, through his/her action an adjustment or maladjustment to his/her border condition is shown. In that way, man has in the limit the sign of his/her identity, but because of his/her freedom he/she has the chance to decide for his own condition or against it -opting then for an inhumane behaviour and incurring in excess or hybris." -the translation is mine-) (Ibid)

In simpler words, he can either embrace his/her condition trying to make the most of it -accepting his 'existence'-, or he can try to fix himself to a certain idea or concept of 'self' (identity) as opposed to 'other' -which means trying to conform to an 'essence'. Such kind ob behavior, however, could be held responsible for many of the 'neurosis' and conflicts inherent to modern men/women. Accepting one's own existence, means -for a start- accepting our bodily presence (and its inevitbale relation to a specific context) as a point of departure to any journey (existential journey, that is) we might undertake. This of course is done not merely through thought, or adherence to a certain discourse ('performativity'); there has to be also an involvement of the praxis ('performatic', non-linguistic, as described by Taylor's reading).

Going back to Gómez Pena's works and writings, what can we find if it is contrasted to Trías idea of the 'limit'? Is it worth mentioning?

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